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Abstract This research uses the maturity of incremental bond issues and
the weighted-average maturity of all outstanding debt and tests
various theories from the corporate debt maturity literature to
discover if real estate investment trust (REIT) debt maturity is
inﬂuenced by liquidity risk, asymmetric information, personal
taxes, and agency problems. The ﬁndings reveal that there is little
to no evidence for the liquidity and asymmetric information
hypotheses; however, there is evidence that personal taxes
inﬂuence the maturity of REIT incremental debt issues, and
agency problems play a role in determining the incremental and
average debt maturity of REITs.
Several theoretical studies have attempted to provide an answer to a relatively
simple question: How do ﬁrms select the maturity of their debt? As noted by
Stiglitz (1974), Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) examination of optimal leverage
in a world with perfect capital markets suggests that there is no optimal debt
maturity. However, once market imperfections are introduced, debt may have an
optimal maturity depending on the various characteristics of the debt contract and
the issuer. To date, theoretical explanations of optimal maturity have focused on
four types of market imperfections: liquidity risk, asymmetric information, taxes,
and agency problems. While the topic of debt maturity has been investigated
empirically in the general corporate ﬁnance literature, the question has yet to be
fully examined in the context of real estate investment trusts (REITs).
Real estate investment trusts provide a particularly interesting framework within
which to analyze the different theories about debt maturity for two reasons. First,
since qualiﬁed REITs do not pay corporate taxes, debt has no inherent corporate
tax advantage for REITs. Second, the dividend payout requirement put in place
by the Real Estate Investment Trust Tax Provision of 1960 reduces the free cash
ﬂow problem. These two characteristics motivate Howe and Shilling (1988) and
Brown and Riddiough (2003) to use REITs to examine the closely related topic
of optimal capital structure. Howe and Shilling examine REIT stock price
reactions to announcements of new security offerings to determine why REITs
issue debt, while Brown and Riddiough focus on liability structure effects and the174  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
degree to which REITs set long-run debt ratio targets. Although both studies
contribute to the REIT debt maturity literature, neither study focuses exclusively
on debt maturity theories.
The current study attempts to determine which theories best explain the maturity
of REIT debt. As such, two general contributions are made to the literature. First,
building on Howe and Shilling (1988) and Brown and Riddiough (2003), four
theories of debt maturity are tested, both separately and jointly. This allows
determination of not only which models are capable of explaining the data, but
also which theories explain the most independent information about the debt
maturity decisions made by REITs. Second, and different from previous studies
in the corporate literature, the theories are analyzed using both the maturity of
incremental debt issues and the weighted-average maturity of all outstanding debt.
The use of incremental debt issues permits examination of marginal debt maturity
decisions and focus on theories based on time-varying parameters, such as
liquidity risk, asymmetric information, and personal taxes.1 On the other hand, the
use of yearly weighted-average maturity observations permits estimation of a
ﬁrm’s ‘‘target’’ debt maturity over the sample period and examination of yearly
deviations away from the estimated target. For this reason, the weighted-average
sample provides more power when testing theories related to static variables, such
as agency problems.
The main body of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a
description of the theories and empirical evidence surrounding debt maturity,
including a set of testable hypotheses for the sample. This is then followed by a
description of the data obtained for analysis. Next, there is a presentation of the
models and a discussion of the results. The paper closes with concluding remarks.
 Theories and Hypotheses
Liquidity Risk
Sharpe (1991), Diamond (1991a), and Titman (1992) suggest that concerns about
liquidity risk, deﬁned as a ﬁrm’s ability to reﬁnance short-term debt, may lead
the ﬁrm to issue long-term debt. In the face of liquidity risk, low-rated ﬁrms will
tend to seek long-term debt due to the high probability that they may be denied
ﬁnancing in the future due to their credit risk. Alternatively, high-rated ﬁrms are
more likely to issue short-term debt due to their relatively low exposure to credit
risk. Thus, the general implication for these liquidity theories is that debt maturity
should be decreasing in credit ratings. Diamond’s (1991a) model, however, posits
that low quality ﬁrms may be screened out of the long-term debt market into
short-term, privately placed debt. The result is a non-monotonic structure in credit
ratings where both high- and low-rated borrowers will use short-term debt while
ﬁrms with intermediate ratings will issue long-term bonds.The Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  175
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Empirically, Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Brown and
Riddiough (2003) ﬁnd a negative relationship between debt maturity and credit
ratings, consistent with the liquidity risk hypothesis. While Stohs and Mauer and
Brown and Riddiough do not directly test Diamond’s hypothesis of a non-
monotonic relationship between credit ratings and maturity, Guedes and Opler
ﬁnd evidence contrary to Diamond (1991a). In their sample, ﬁrms that issue
intermediate-term bonds actually have lower credit ratings than those that issue
short- and long-term debt.2 This result, however, could be due to low credit ﬁrms
being forced into private debt placements.
A test of the liquidity theory of debt maturity is constructed by comparing both
the maturity of incremental debt issues and the weighted-average maturity of high-
and low-rated ﬁrms to intermediate-rated ﬁrms as classiﬁed by Standard and
Poor’s. This allows a test for a negative relation between the maturity of REIT
debt and ﬁrm credit quality, and also allows a test of Diamond’s (1991a) theory
by not imposing a monotonic relationship between the two variables. A dummy
variable for private placements is included for each incremental debt issue in the
event that low quality borrowers are forced out of the public debt market as
Diamond (1991a) hypothesizes. In addition, the ﬁrm’s debt-to-equity ratio is
employed to control for the REITs’ exposure to liquidity risk. Similar to Stohs
and Mauer (1996) and Brown and Riddiough (2003), an ordinal ranking of credit
ratings is also used to more robustly examine the liquidity hypothesis.
Asymmetric Information
Flannery (1986) examines the maturity structure of a ﬁrm’s risky debt using a
model where debt serves as a signal of credit quality. In his model, ﬁrms hold
information not known to the market, and the choice of maturity serves as a signal
to the market about the nature of the asymmetric information. The result is a
separating equilibrium in which ﬁrms with positive asymmetric information will
issue short-term debt, while those with negative information will issue long-term
debt. Hence, ﬁrms with positive information can beneﬁt from the reﬁnancing
process by enjoying lower ﬁnancing costs once the information becomes publicly
available. In contrast, ﬁrms with negative information will issue long-term debt
to avoid re-evaluation because the release of negative information will increase
the cost of ﬁnancing.
Empirically, Guedes and Opler (1996) ﬁnd that the debt maturity choice is not
related to future stock market performance, a result inconsistent with signaling
models. Alternatively, Stohs and Mauer (1996) ﬁnd that future changes in
earnings-per-share (EPS) are negatively correlated to debt maturity, although the
economic signiﬁcance of the result is questionable. Finally, Howe and Shilling
(1988) ﬁnd that REIT stock prices react positively to short-term bank debt, but
there is no stock reaction to issues of long-term callable bonds. Following Stohs
and Mauer (1996), the signaling theory is tested by observing the relationship176  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
between incremental debt maturity and future changes in operating performance.
If REITs are signaling private information to the market, then analyst expectations
for funds from operations (FFO) should improve when the ﬁrm announces the
placement of short-term debt. Although Howe and Shilling (1988) focus on stock
prices, the use of FFO permits examination of both publicly traded and privately
held REITs.
Personal Taxes
Boyce and Kalotay (1979) were the ﬁrst to note that the term structure of interest
rates may affect debt maturity when taxes are present. Lewis (1990), however,
posits that if capital structure decisions are made in a world where the only market
imperfection is corporate and personal taxes, debt will have no optimal maturity.
Thus, taxes will inﬂuence the optimal debt-to-equity ratio of the ﬁrm, but the
choice of debt maturity itself will be irrelevant. On the other hand, Brick and
Ravid (1985) develop an equilibrium model where bankruptcy and agency costs
are possible, leverage is constant, and ﬁrms retain no earnings. They show that
when corporate taxes are less (greater) than personal taxes, the optimal maturity
is a decreasing (increasing) function of the slope of the term structure of interest
rates.
Although Guedes and Opler (1996) reject Brick and Ravid’s (1985) tax hypothesis,
Highﬁeld (2005) ﬁnds evidence supporting it. These conﬂicting results may be
due to the irrelevance proposition of Lewis (1990), or to the presence of different
tax rates across industries. If Brick and Ravid’s tax hypothesis is true, then an
increase in the slope of the yield curve will result in a decrease in the maturity
of incremental debt issues when the corporate tax rate is below the personal tax
rate. However, if companies where the corporate rate is greater than the personal
tax rate are included, the opposite would be true.
A weakness of previous studies has been an inability to observe the relation
between corporate and personal tax rates, potentially leading to confounding
empirical results. One advantage of testing the tax-hypothesis using REITs is that
the corporate tax rate is zero for all ﬁrms because of their pass-through status;
therefore, personal tax rates will be higher than corporate tax rates for the entire
sample. Thus, REIT data allows for a ‘‘cleaner’’ test of the relationship between
personal taxes and maturity since changes in the yield curve inﬂuence the tax
advantage (or disadvantage) of debt in the same way for every company in the
sample.
This study uses the yield spread of 30-year Treasury bonds over 1-year Treasury
notes to characterize the term structure premium and test Brick and Ravid’s (1985)
tax-incentive hypothesis against the irrelevance hypothesis proposed by Lewis
(1990). Because the tax hypothesis relates only to incremental debt issues, we
only test for a negative relation between the term structure premium and the
maturity of incremental debt issues.3 However, if Lewis (1990) is correct, thereThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  177
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should be no signiﬁcant relationship between the slope of the yield curve and the
maturity of new bond issues after controlling for other market imperfections.
Because Brick and Ravid assume a static capital structure, the REIT’s debt-to-
asset ratio is included here as a control variable.
Agency Problems
Myers (1977) suggests that many assets held by ﬁrms are in the form of real
options. He shows that when debt is included in a ﬁrm’s capital structure, it
may induce managers to forego valuable projects when creditors, instead of
stockholders, will capture the project’s revenues. Thus, he suggests that the use
of short-term debt may reduce the incentive for ﬁrms to underinvest by forcing
renegotiation of the debt prior to the exercise date of the options. Myers also
argues that matching debt maturity to the maturity of the ﬁrm’s assets can further
reduce the agency costs of debt. This suggests that ﬁrms with more growth options
should include less debt in their capital structure, shorten the maturity of debt
issues, or match debt maturity to asset maturity in order to avoid underinvestment.
In testing the agency theory of debt, researchers posit that smaller ﬁrms will tend
to hold more real options than their larger counterparts, and hence will hold
relatively high amounts of short-term debt. Empirical research has thus focused
on testing for a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and debt maturity. While
Mitchell (1991), Barclay and Smith (1995), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Ooi
(1999) ﬁnd a positive relation between debt maturity and ﬁrm size, Carey, Prowse,
Rhea, and Udell (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) ﬁnd that ﬁrm size is
inversely related to debt maturity. Alternatively, Guedes and Opler (1996) ﬁnd that
large ﬁrms issue at both ends of the maturity spectrum while small ﬁrms tend to
issue long-term debt. One possible explanation for these conﬂicting results is that
ﬁrm size may also be an indicator of liquidity risk and informational asymmetry,
thereby clouding the analysis.
Guedes and Opler (1996) and Stohs and Mauer (1996) also test Myers’ (1977)
hypothesis by including the market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth
opportunities in addition to measures of asset maturity. Although Stohs and Mauer
ﬁnd little evidence that ﬁrms with high market-to-book ratios issue debt at shorter
maturities, they do ﬁnd that ﬁrms with longer-lived assets tend to issue longer-
term debt. Guedes and Opler, on the other hand, ﬁnd that ﬁrms with high market-
to-book ratios issue at shorter maturities. Despite also reporting a positive
correlation between asset and debt maturity in the sample, Guedes and Opler note
that ﬁrms issuing bonds with 20 year maturities have lower asset maturities than
those that issue relatively short-term debt, a ﬁnding inconsistent with Myers’
hypothesis.
Following the lead of previous research, two empirical tests are constructed for
the relation between agency problems and debt maturity. First, the theory that
ﬁrms with high growth opportunities prefer short-term debt is tested by examining178  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
the impact of both the market-to-book ratio and ﬁrm size on the maturity of a
ﬁrm’s incremental as well as weighted-average debt. Second, a direct relation
between asset maturity and weighted-average debt maturity is tested under the
hypothesis that matching the two maturities can help reduce the agency costs of
debt. Asset maturity is proxied by using the ratio of gross depreciable property
divided by annual depreciation expense.4
 Data
Data Description and Source
Unlike previous research, this research uses information about a ﬁrm’s incremental
debt issues as well as the ﬁrm’s weighted-average maturity of all debt to test the
different hypotheses about how a ﬁrm chooses its debt maturity. The use of new
debt issues provides greater power when testing theories related to time-varying
ﬁrm characteristics, while the use of weighted-average maturity is more robust for
testing theories related to time invariant variables.
The sample of new debt issues includes 396 non-convertible corporate debt
instruments issued by 84 U.S. equity REITs between January 1, 1993 and
December 31, 2002. In the event that the same ﬁrm has multiple bond issues on
the same date, the average maturity of the entire set of issues is used. Bond issue
information was obtained from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum U.S.
Corporate New Issues database (SDC).5 U.S. Treasury data was obtained from the
FRED II database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to construct estimates
of the Treasury yield curve, and was used to match the estimate of the effective
slope of the yield curve to the bond issue data based on the date of issue. Finally,
the information contained in the sample was augmented by collecting analyst FFO
estimates from Thomson Financial’s Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
(I/B/E/S), along with ﬁrm-speciﬁc data from SNL REIT Datasource (SNL).6
In addition to the incremental debt issue sample discussed above, the end-of-year
weighted-average debt maturity sample consists of 312 observations on 85 REITs
over the sample period January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2005.7 The
weighted-average debt maturity for each REIT, along with other ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information, was obtained from the SNL database, and the sample was restricted
to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating
companies.8 Again, analyst FFO estimates were obtained from Thomson
Financial’s Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S).
Time Distribution
Panel A in Exhibit 1 shows the distribution of incremental debt issues in the
sample by year of issue. Corresponding to the consolidation of REITs in the late
1990s documented by Ambrose, Highﬁeld, and Linneman (2005), the heaviestThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  179
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Exhibit 1  Time Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average Maturity
Panel A: Time Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity
Year # of Obs.
Incremental Debt Issue Maturity (Years)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
1993 14 (10) 8.96 10.00 15.23 2.00
1994 12 (9) 6.48 7.06 10.14 1.03
1995 35 (29) 10.25 10.00 20.26 2.83
1996 45 (30) 11.17 10.00 30.54 1.01
1997 86 (64) 8.16 7.36 30.00 1.01
1998 98 (69) 11.02 8.00 32.41 1.01
1999 37 (32) 8.87 8.00 20.28 1.06
2000 30 (28) 9.83 9.93 20.67 3.00
2001 30 (26) 9.93 8.09 30.00 2.03
2002 9 (8) 5.74 5.06 10.16 2.03
Total 396 Bond Issues 9.64 6.17 32.41 1.01
Panel B: Time Distribution of REIT Weighted-Average Maturity
Year # of Obs.
REIT Weighted-Average Maturity (Years)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
1996 22 (22) 8.37 7.73 32.25 1.08
1997 28 (28) 8.78 7.48 31.25 0.63
1998 24 (24) 6.84 6.42 14.92 0.47
1999 36 (36) 7.28 6.57 14.30 1.00
2000 29 (29) 6.86 6.30 13.70 1.75
2001 33 (22) 6.49 6.00 11.42 3.75
2002 38 (38) 6.03 6.00 10.90 1.00
2003 35 (35) 5.99 5.50 10.60 3.04
2004 36 (36) 5.68 5.10 9.00 2.21
2005 31 (31) 5.84 5.70 8.40 3.90
Total 312 REIT Years 6.71 6.08 32.25 0.47
Notes: Panel A presents the time distribution for the incremental debt sample of 396 non-
convertible debt instruments issued by 84 U.S. REITs between January 1, 1993 and December 31,
2002. In the event that the same ﬁrm issues more than one bond on the same date, the dollar-
weighted average maturity of the entire issue is used. The number of REITs issuing in a particular
year is reported in parentheses. Note that REITs may issue multiple times per year and in multiple
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Exhibit 1  (continued)
Time Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average Maturity
Panel B presents the time distribution for 312 observations on 85 REITs with observable yearly
weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2005. The sample
is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating companies.
Not all REITs have an observable weighted-average maturity for each year. The number of REITs
observed per year is reported in parentheses. For yearly observations, the number of REITs
observed equals the number of observations.
volume of new issues in the sample occurred in 1997 and 1998. Overall, the mean
maturity for the sample is 9.64 years, and ranges from an average maturity of
5.74 years in 2002 to 11.17 years in 1996.
Panel B in Exhibit 1 provides the distribution of weighted-average maturity
observations in the sample by year of observation. Unlike the relatively large
variation observed in the incremental sample, the means for the weighted-average
maturity sample ranges from a low of 5.68 years in 2004 to a high of 8.78 years
in 1997. The medians also exhibit a narrow range of 5.10 years to 7.73 years.
Given the relatively small variation in mean and median values, it appears the
weighted-average maturity of REIT debt has not changed much over the sample
period, a ﬁnding consistent with the notion that REITs have a speciﬁc maturity
target for their liability structure.
Property Focus Distribution
Panel A in Exhibit 2 shows the property focus distribution of incremental debt
issues. The mean maturity ranges from 7.65 years for hotel REITs to 10.82 years
for ofﬁce REITs. As shown, over 50% of the sample is comprised of bonds issued
by residential and retail REITs, and ofﬁce REITs comprise an additional 15% of
the sample.
Panel B in Exhibit 2 presents the property focus distribution of the weighted-
average maturity sample. Similar to the incremental issues sample presented in
Panel A, over 60% of the weighted-average maturity sample is comprised of ofﬁce,
residential, and retail REITs. Unlike the distribution across time, there is
substantial variation in REIT weighted-average maturity across property
investment focus.
Credit Rating Distribution
Panel A in Exhibit 3 presents the distribution of incremental debt issues across
bond ratings. Ratings range from CCC to AA and 91.7% of the sample has anThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  181
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Exhibit 2  Property Focus Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average
Maturity
Panel A: Property Focus Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity
Property Focus # of Issues
Incremental Debt Issue Maturity (Years)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Diversiﬁed/Other 32 (8) 10.66 8.79 32.41 1.01
Health Care 62 (6) 9.15 8.05 30.00 2.00
Hotel 15 (8) 7.65 7.05 30.00 2.17
Industrial 21 (5) 8.34 9.10 16.91 2.21
Ofﬁce 61 (17) 10.82 8.00 30.51 3.07
Residential 91 (18) 10.09 9.78 32.41 1.03
Retail 106 (19) 9.11 9.00 30.54 1.01
Self-Storage 8 (3) 9.57 7.09 30.38 2.09
Total 396 Bond Issues 9.64 6.17 32.41 1.01
Panel B: Property Focus Distribution of REIT Weighted-Average Maturity
Property Focus # of Obs.
REIT Weighted-Average Maturity (Years)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Diversiﬁed/Other 31 (8) 7.62 7.10 24.33 0.58
Health Care 9 (4) 5.05 6.08 7.25 1.75
Hotel 43 (12) 5.89 6.00 10.00 1.00
Industrial 32 (9) 7.07 6.60 14.30 0.98
Ofﬁce 65 (16) 6.02 5.70 14.92 0.47
Residential 70 (19) 8.49 7.63 32.25 0.63
Retail 59 (15) 5.80 5.17 14.00 3.00
Self-Storage 3 (2) 1.36 1.08 2.00 1.00
Total 312 REIT Years 6.71 6.08 32.25 0.47
Notes: Panel A presents the property focus distribution for the incremental debt sample of 396
non-convertible debt instruments issued by 84 U.S. REITs between January 1, 1993 and December
31, 2002. In the event that the same ﬁrm issues more than one bond on the same date, the
dollar-weighted average maturity of the entire issue is used. The number of REITs observed in a
particular property focus is reported in parentheses. Note that REITs may issue multiple times per
year and in multiple years.
Panel B presents the property focus distribution for 312 observations on 85 REITs with observable
yearly weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2005. The
sample is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating
companies. The number of REITs observed per property focus is reported in parentheses.182  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 3  S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average
Maturity
Panel A: S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity (Years)
S&P Rating S&P Number # of Issues Mean Median Maximum Minimum
AAA 27 0 (0) — — — —
AAA 26 0 (0) — — — —
AAA 25 0 (0) — — — —
AA 24 0 (0) — — — —
AA 23 2 (1) 9.27 9.93 12.23 5.00
AA 22 4 (1) 13.50 13.50 20.00 7.00
A 21 9 (9) 17.55 10.15 30.54 2.00
A 20 19 (12) 12.00 10.16 32.41 3.00
A 19 31 (20) 10.55 10.00 25.24 1.01
BBB 18 67 (24) 9.91 10.00 30.00 1.02
BBB 17 137 (28) 9.00 8.00 32.41 1.01
BBB 16 94 (26) 8.99 8.07 30.39 1.03
BB 15 11 (9) 8.91 7.04 30.00 4.00
BB 14 7 (7) 9.74 8.00 20.00 5.10
BB 13 3 (3) 7.29 6.89 10.00 4.99
B 12 7 (5) 9.35 9.68 15.21 2.00
B 11 3 (3) 10.60 7.00 20.00 4.79
B 10 0 (0) — — — —
CCC 9 1 (1) 7.13 7.13 7.13 7.13
CCC 8 1 (1) 6.97 6.97 6.97 6.97
CCC 7 0 (0) — — — —
CC 6 0 (0) — — — —
CC 5 0 (0) — — — —
CC 4 0 (0) — — — —
C 3 0 (0) — — — —
C 2 0 (0) — — — —
C 1 0 (0) — — — —
Total 396 Bond Issues 9.64 6.17 32.41 1.01
Panel B: S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Weighted-Average Maturity
S&P Rating S&P Number # of Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum
AAA 27 0 (0) — — — —
AAA 26 0 (0) — — — —
AAA 25 0 (0) — — — —The Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  183
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Exhibit 3  (continued)
S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average Maturity
Panel B: S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Weighted-Average Maturity (continued)
S&P Rating S&P Number # of Obs. Mean Median Maximum Minimum
AA 24 0 (0) — — — —
AA 23 0 (0) — — — —
AA 22 0 (0) — — — —
A 21 2 (2) 6.48 6.48 8.60 4.35
A 20 5 (2) 7.96 8.00 9.10 6.40
A 19 14 (6) 6.48 6.58 9.60 4.25
BBB 18 41 (23) 6.38 6.20 21.75 0.63
BBB 17 100 (29) 7.77 6.55 32.25 0.47
BBB 16 56 (25) 6.13 5.85 17.58 1.00
BB 15 29 (15) 7.58 7.92 13.20 1.75
BB 14 19 (10) 6.33 6.50 24.33 0.58
BB 13 20 (12) 5.56 5.75 8.58 0.98
B 12 12 (4) 5.37 5.50 7.90 4.40
B 11 4 (4) 4.68 4.90 7.00 2.58
B 10 4 (3) 3.87 3.75 5.00 2.99
CCC 9 6 (2) 2.87 2.35 7.00 1.00
CCC 8 0 (0) — — — —
CCC 7 0 (0) — — — —
CC 6 0 (0) — — — —
CC 5 0 (0) — — — —
CC 4 0 (0) — — — —
C 3 0 (0) — — — —
C 2 0 (0) — — — —
C 1 0 (0) — — — —
Total 312 REIT Years 6.71 6.08 32.25 0.47
Notes: Panel A presents the S&P ratings distribution for the incremental debt sample of 396 non-
convertible debt instruments issued by 84 U.S. REITs between January 1, 1993 and December 31,
2002. In the case where an S&P rating was not available but a Moody’s or Fitch rating was
reported, the Moody’s or Fitch rating was converted into the equivalent S&P rating. In the event
that the same ﬁrm issues more than one bond on the same date, the dollar-weighted average
maturity of the entire issue is used. The number of REITs per ratings class is reported in
parentheses. Note that REITs may issue multiple times per year and in multiple years. In addition,
ratings may change between bond issues.184  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 3  (continued)
S&P Debt Rating Distribution of REIT Incremental Debt Issue Maturity and Weighted-Average Maturity
Panel B presents the S&P ratings distribution for 312 observations on 85 REITs with observable
yearly weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2005. The
sample is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating
companies. In the case where an S&P rating was not available but a Moody’s or Fitch rating was
reported, the Moody’s or Fitch rating was converted into the equivalent S&P rating. The number of
REITs observed per property focus is reported in parentheses. Note that REITs may be observed for
only one or all sample years. In addition, ratings may change between observed years.
investment grade S&P debt rating.9 In particular, over 34.6% of the sample has a
BBB rating, and the addition of BBB and BBB– issues contributes 16.9% and
23.7% of the sample, respectively. In addition, the maturity for the CCC rated
bond, 6.97 years, is much shorter than the average maturity for A rated bonds
at 17.55 years. In general, it appears that A– and higher rated issues have longer
maturities than BBB and lower rated issues.
Panel B in Exhibit 3 shows the S&P rating distribution of the weighted-average
maturity sample. Similar to the incremental issue sample, ratings range from
CCC to A, and approximately 70% of the sample has an investment grade
rating. Again, the highest concentration of observations, 63%, falls within the
BBB– to BBB range.
Summary Statistics
Panel A in Exhibit 4 presents the sample summary statistics for the incremental
bond issues. Approximately 16.4% of the sample has an S&P rating of A or
higher (S&P HIGHRATE), and 8.3% have a rating of BB or lower (S&P
LOWRATE). The remaining 75.3% has an S&P rating between BBB– and BBB
(S&P MIDRATE). The average S&P ordinal ranking is just over 17, which
represents an average ranking of BBB. During the sample period the yield on 30-
year Treasury bonds exceeds the yield on 1-year Treasury notes by an average of
98 basis points. The average debt-to-asset ratio is 47.4%, and the average asset
maturity, calculated by dividing gross depreciable property by depreciation
expense, is 40.6 years. On average, analyst estimates of FFO for the following
year are 29.42% higher than current FFO per share. About 12% of the bonds were
used to retire existing debt, and 33.8% of the issues were private placements.
Panel B in Exhibit 4 presents the sample summary statistics for the 312
observations on 85 REITs with an observable weighted-average maturity for a
given year. Approximately 7% of the sample has an S&P rating of A– or higher,
63% has an S&P rating between BBB– and BBB, and 30% has a rating of BBThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  185
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Exhibit 4  Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
Panel A: REIT Incremental Debt Issues
FINAL MATURITY 9.640 6.169 32.414 1.014
S&P HIGHRATE 0.164 0.371 1.000 0.000
S&P MIDRATE 0.753 0.415 1.000 0.000
S&P LOWRATE 0.083 0.277 1.000 0.000
S&P NUMBER 17.093 1.865 23.000 8.000
TOTAL CAPt1 ($M) 2,182.330 2,470.969 15,612.900 112.545
M/B RATIOt1 2.084 2.091 36.353 0.571
YIELD (30–1) 0.983 0.771 3.810 0.520
D/A RATIOt1 (%) 47.366 16.029 83.128 0.000
ASSET MATURITY 40.464 14.215 175.790 20.280
FFO (%) 26.588 53.487 348.879 53.548
ROLLOVER 0.121 0.327 1.000 0.000
PRIVATE 0.338 0.474 1.000 0.000
Panel B: REIT Weighted-Average Maturity
AVERAGE MATURITY 6.708 3.526 32.250 0.467
S&P HIGHRATE 0.068 0.251 1.000 0.000
S&P MIDRATE 0.631 0.483 1.000 0.000
S&P LOWRATE 0.301 0.460 1.000 0.000
S&P NUMBER 15.974 2.219 21.000 9.000
TOTAL CAP ($M) 4,719.468 5,748.661 36,958.800 110.500
M/B RATIO 1.672 0.835 10.506 0.271
D/A RATIO (%) 55.715 12.985 89.785 2.831
ASSET MATURITY 36.654 12.662 112.609 11.437
FFO (%) 13.194 47.197 322.251 49.077
Notes: Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the incremental debt sample of 396 non-
convertible debt instruments issued by 84 U.S. REITs between January 1, 1993 and December 31,
2002. In the event that the same ﬁrm issues more than one bond on the same date, the dollar-
weighted average maturity of the entire issue is used. FINAL MATURITY is the ﬁnal maturity of the
bond issue in years. S&P HIGHRATE is a binary variable for bonds issued by ﬁrms rated as A
or higher by S&P at the time of issuance, and S&P LOWRATE is a binary variable for bonds
issued by ﬁrms rated as BB or lower by S&P at the time of issuance. S&P NR is a binary
variable for ﬁrms without a credit rating. S&P NUMBER is an ordinal credit rating measure
ranging from 1 to 27, corresponding to S&P Ratings C to AAA, respectively. In the case
where an S&P rating was not available but a Moody’s or Fitch rating was reported, the Moody’s
or Fitch rating was converted into the equivalent S&P rating. TOTAL CAPt1 is the lag total186  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 4  (continued)
Summary Statistics
capitalization of the issuing ﬁrm expressed in millions. M/B RATIOt1 is the one-year lag of the
issuing ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio. YIELD (30–1) is the difference between the yields on 30-year T-
bonds and 1-year T-bills on the date of issue. D/A RATIOt1 is the one-year lag of the debt-to-
asset ratio of the issuing REIT expressed as a percentage. ASSET MATURITY is the estimated
maturity of the assets of the REIT’s in years calculated by dividing gross depreciable property by
depreciation expense. FFO is the percentage change from the actual current FFO per share to
the expectation of FFOt1 as measured by the I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO at time t. PRIVATE
is a binary variable for private placements, and ROLLOVER is a binary variable for bond issues
used to retire existing debt.
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics for 312 observations on 85 REITs reporting yearly
weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2005. The sample
is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating companies.
Note that REITs may be observed for only one or all sample years. AVERAGE MATURITY is the
weighted-average maturity reported by a REIT in years. S&P HIGHRATE, MIDRATE, LOWRATE,
and S&P NUMBER are deﬁned the same way as presented in Panel A. TOTAL CAP is the total
capitalization of the REIT in millions and M/B RATIO is the market-to-book ratio of the REIT.
Likewise, D/A RATIO is the debt-to-asset ratio of the REIT expressed as a percentage and ASSET
MATURITY is the estimated maturity of the REIT’s assets in years calculated by dividing gross
depreciable property by depreciation expense. Finally, FFO is the percentage change from the
actual current FFO per share to the expectation of FFOt1 as measured by the I/B/E/S analyst
forecast of FFO at time t.
or lower. The average ﬁrm in the sample has a total market capitalization of over
$4.7 billion and a market-to-book ratio of 1.67. The average debt-to-asset ratio is
approximately 56%. The average asset maturity is 37 years.
 Econometric Methods
Since liquidity, asymmetric information, and tax theories generally posit that
maturity is related to variables that ﬂuctuate considerably over time, the use of
incremental debt issues will tend to have more power when testing these theories.
Agency theories, on the other hand, tend to relate maturity to more stable
variables, making the use of the weighted-average maturity of debt more powerful
for testing.
The Determinants of Incremental Debt Issue Maturity
Using the natural logarithm of the maturity of the incremental bond issue as the
dependent variable, the following models of bond issue maturity can be estimated
as:The Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  187
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LN(MATURITY)t,i
    S&P HIGHRATE   S&P LOWRATE 01 t,i 2 t,i
  LN(TOTALCAP)   LN(M/BR A T I O ) 3 t1,i 4 t1,i
  YIELD(301)   D/A RATIO 5 t 6 t1,i
  LN(ASSET MATURITY)   FFO 7 t,i 8 t,i
  PRIVATE   ROLLOVER 9 t,i 10 t,i
 Control Variables  , jj , i i (1)
and
LN(MATURITY)t,i
    S&P RATING   LN(TOTALCAP) 01 t,i 2 t1,i
  LN(M/BR A T I O )   YIELD(301) 3 t1,i 4 t
  D/A RATIO   LN(ASSET MATURITY) 5 t1,i 6 i
  FFO   PRIVATE   ROLLOVER 7 t,i 8 t,i 9 t,i
 Control Variables  . jj , i i (2)
The two models differ only in their treatment of the S&P ratings. The debt
maturity measure LN(MATURITY) is calculated as the natural logarithm of the
term to ﬁnal maturity, the difference in months between the issue date of the bond
and the maturity date as stated on the bond indenture.10 S&P HIGHRATE is a
binary variable representing REITs with a credit rating of A or above, while
S&P LOWRATE represents issues with a credit rating of BB or below. The
variable S&P RATING is an ordinal variable representing the ﬁrm’s credit risk as
measured by Standard & Poor’s. The assigned numerical values are listed in
Exhibit 3. LN(TOTAL CAPt1) and LN(M/B RATIOt1) are the natural logarithms
of a REIT’s total capitalization and market-to-book ratio as reported in the most
recent ﬁnancial statement prior to the date of the incremental issue, respectively.
The variable YIELD(30–1) is the spread of the 30-year Treasury bond over 1-year
Treasury notes at the time of issue, and D/A RATIOt1 is the one-year lag debt-
to-asset ratio. The variable LN(ASSET MATURITYt) is the ﬁrm’s estimated asset
maturity. It is calculated by dividing gross depreciable property by annual
depreciation in the year of the issue. Finally, FFOt is the percentage change from
the actual current FFO per share to the expectation of FFOt1 as measured by the188  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO at time t.11 Control variables are also included
for the property focus of the issuing REIT and dummy variables signaling private
placements (PRIVATE). In addition, since many debt maturity theories focus on
the ﬁnancing of projects, a dummy variable for issues employed to rollover or
retire existing debt (ROLLOVER) is also included.
The Determinants of Weighted-Average Debt Maturity
This study does not have information on incremental bank and mortgage debt for
REITs, though Brown and Riddiough (2003) mention that bank debt and
mortgages are less signiﬁcant because they are usually issued at higher frequencies
and in smaller increments. Nevertheless, in an effort to ensure that the incremental
results are not driven by the absence of bank and mortgage debt, and to better
investigate the asset-matching hypothesis of debt maturity presented in Myers
(1977), the following ﬁxed-effects panel models on the weighted-average maturity
sample are estimated as:
LN(WAVG MATURITY)t,i
    S&P HIGHRATE   S&P LOWRATE 01 t,i 2 t,i
  LN(TOTAL CAP)   LN(M/B RATIO) 3 t,i 4 t,i
  D/A RATIO   LN(ASSET MATURITY) 5 t,i 6 t,i
  FFO   , 7 t,i t,i (3)
and
LN(WAVG MATURITY)t,i
    S&P NUMBER   LN(TOTAL CAP) 01 t,i 2 t,i
  LN(M/BR A T I O )   D/AR A T I O 3 t,i 4 t,i
  LN(ASSET MATURITY)   FFO   , 5 t,i 6 t,i t,i (4)
where LN(WAVG MATURITY) is the natural logarithm of the weighted-average
maturity reported for a given REIT in a given year, and the remaining variables
are deﬁned as before with the exception that they are end of year observations
associated with an observed end-of-year REIT weighted-average maturity.12
Finally, it is reasonable to assume that REITs target a speciﬁc debt maturity level
around which their yearly weighted-average maturity ﬂuctuates. Thus to furtherThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  189
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ensure the robustness of the results, all variables over the sample period are
averaged for each of the 85 REITs observed during the period. This cross-sectional
format allows for a better focus on the long-run ‘‘target’’ maturity and the
inclusion of property-focus control variables.13 The revised cross-sectional models
are similar to Equations 3 and 4 where the dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of each REIT’s mean weighted-average (target) maturity, LN(TARGET
MATURITY), across the sample, and the remaining variables are deﬁned as before
with the exception that they are now averages.
 Results
Since the theories presented are not mutually exclusive, and since a joint
regression may obscure the correlation for some variables, each theory is tested
separately (but not reported) by including in the regression only the variables
hypothesized to be important by that particular theory. As a matter of robustness,
no variable is statistically signiﬁcant in the individual regressions but insigniﬁcant
in the joint regression. Moreover, the ﬁndings reveal the same qualitative results
in all models considered.
Liquidity Risk
Exhibit 5 shows the results of the models using the sample of 396 incremental
debt issues. The ﬁndings indicate that high-rated REITs issue debt with longer
maturities than intermediate-rated REITs, while low-rated REITs tend to issue debt
with shorter maturities than intermediate-rated REITs. These results are
inconsistent with the liquidity hypothesis. Furthermore, the results indicate that
going from mid-rated status to high-rated status increases incremental debt
maturity by about 2.1 years, while a one-unit increase in S&P ratings increases
incremental debt maturity by about 4.5 months, on average. As shown in Exhibit
6, the panel models using the weighted-average maturity of REIT debt also yield
results that are inconsistent with the liquidity hypothesis. Similar to the ﬁndings
in Brown and Riddiough (2003), the analysis in this study indicates a positive
relationship between ﬁrm quality and debt maturity even when other ﬁrm
characteristics such as leverage and ﬁrm size are considered.
As Brown and Riddiough (2003) suggest, a positive relation between credit ratings
and debt maturity may be consistent with Diamond’s (1991a) hypothesis since the
sample contains primarily mid-rated ﬁrms. Note, however, that the A and AA
rated ﬁrms, as suggested by the variable S&P HIGHRATE, tend to issue at the
longest maturity. In addition, the placement of private debt tends to be long-term,
making Diamond’s theory an unlikely explanation for the observed data. Though
this contradiction of the liquidity hypothesis in the incremental regression may be
biased by the exclusion of bank and mortgage debt, it is conﬁrmed by the
regression results presented in Exhibit 7 when the mean weighted-average (target)
maturity of all debt is the dependent variable.190  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 5  Cross-Sectional Regression Models for REIT Incremental Debt Issues
Model 1 Model 2
INTERCEPT 2.980*** 3.065** 2.591** 2.662**
(2.650) (2.590) (2.300) (2.230)
S&P HIGHRATE 0.217** 0.224**
(2.410) (2.500)
S&P LOWRATE 0.046 0.053
(0.450) (0.490)
S&P NUMBER 0.042** 0.042**
(2.560) (2.540)
LN(TOTAL CAP)t1 0.047 0.051 0.058 0.061
(1.210) (1.25) (1.540) (1.530)
LN(M/B RATIO)t1 0.068** 0.049* 0.058* 0.049*
(1.970) (1.730) (1.800) (1.820)
YIELD(30–1) 0.091** 0.086** 0.097** 0.092**
(2.190) (2.040) (2.370) (2.220)
D/A RATIOt1 0.123 0.104 0.107 0.079
(0.540) (0.420) (0.470) (0.320)
LN(ASSET MATURITY) 0.021 0.008 0.007 0.006
(0.140) (0.050) (0.050) (0.040)
FFO 0.019 0.025 0.018 0.022
(1.460) (1.500) (1.450) (1.590)
PRIVATE 0.109** 0.110** 0.109** 0.110**
(1.970) (1.990) (2.020) (2.090)
DIVERSIFIED FOCUS 0.016 0.018
(0.140) (0.150)
HEALTH CARE FOCUS 0.038 0.032
(0.380) (0.310)
HOTEL FOCUS 0.035 0.043
(0.260) (0.320)
INDUSTRIAL FOCUS 0.019 0.035
(0.150) (0.270)
OFFICE FOCUS 0.133 0.114
(1.280) (1.100)
RESIDENTIAL FOCUS 0.103 0.093
(1.090) (1.000)
SELF STORAGE FOCUS 0.030 0.044
(0.110) (0.160)
Adj. R2 0.114 0.124 0.129 0.126
Notes: The incremental debt sample contains 396 non-convertible debt instruments issued by 84
U.S. REITs between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2002. The dependent variable is theThe Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  191
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Exhibit 5  (continued)
Cross-Sectional Regression Models for REIT Incremental Debt Issues
natural logarithm of the issue’s term to ﬁnal maturity. S&P HIGHRATE and LOWRATE are a binary
variable for bonds issued by ﬁrms rated as A or higher at the time of issuance, or BB or lower
at the time of issuance, respectively. S&P NUMBER is an ordinal credit rating measure ranging
from 1 to 27, corresponding to C to AAA, respectively. LN(TOTAL CAP)t1 is the natural
logarithm of the one-year lag total capitalization of the issuing ﬁrm. LN(M/B RATIO)t1 is the
natural logarithm of the one-year lag of the issuing ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio. YIELD(30–1)i s
difference between the yield on the 30-year Treasury bond and the yield on the 1-year Treasury
note on the date of issue. D/A RATIOt1 is the one-year lag debt-to-asset ratio of the issuing REIT.
LN(ASSET MATURITY) is the natural logarithm of the estimated maturity of the assets of the REIT
calculated by dividing gross depreciable property by depreciation expense. FFO is the
percentage change from the actual current FFO per share to the expectation of FFOt1 as
measured by the I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO at time t. PRIVATE is a binary variable for
private placements. Binary variables for property focus of the REIT: DIVERSIFIED, HEALTH CARE,
HOTEL, INDUSTRIAL, OFFICE, RESIDENTIAL, SELF STORAGE, and RETAIL (reference) are included.
ROLLOVER (not presented) is a binary variable for bonds issued to retire existing debt and is used
as a control variable. t-Statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Asymmetric Information
The signaling of asymmetric information is tested by hypothesizing that short-
term debt should predict improved future performance as measured by the
percentage change from the actual current FFO per share to the expectation of
FFOt1 as measured by the I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO at time t. Notice that
in Exhibit 5, unlike Stohs and Mauer’s (1996) result for EPS, the coefﬁcient of
the change in FFO is not signiﬁcant in explaining the maturity of REIT debt.
Although not reported in the exhibits, equivalent results are found when EPS and
actual FFO are used instead of analyst forecasts for FFO. In general, the results
are inconsistent with Howe and Shilling (1988) who ﬁnd that, consistent with
Flannery’s (1986) signaling hypothesis, the stock price reaction to the
announcement of short-term bank debt is positive. The different ﬁndings could be
the result of the stock market reacting to the type of debt being issued (e.g., public
vs. monitored debt), not the maturity of the debt. For instance, Diamond (1991b)
would suggest that a ﬁrm that had gone from being a low-quality to a mid-quality
credit risk would also switch from public debt to private bank loans. However, as
noted by Howe and Shilling (1988), it is not possible to determine if the positive
stock return they observe is generated by the maturity of the debt (the signaling
hypothesis) or the fact that a bank (monitor) is willing to extend the credit.192  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 6  Fixed Effects Unbalanced Panel Regression Models for REIT Weighted-Average Maturity









LN(TOTAL CAP) 0.152** 0.196**
(1.980) (2.460)
LN(M/B RATIO) 0.171* 0.187*
(1.700) (1.780)
D/A RATIO 1.830* 1.679**
(1.930) (2.330)




FIXED-EFFECTS R2 0.122 0.282
Notes: The weighted-average maturity sample contains 312 observations on 85 REITs with
observable yearly weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31,
2005. The sample is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit
rating companies. This exhibit reports the results of a ﬁxed effects unbalanced panel regression
model where the dependent variable is the weighted-average maturity reported by observed REITs
for observed years. Note that each REIT may be observed for only one or all sample years. Thus,
there are eight unbalanced panels with a maximum of 63 observations per panel. S&P HIGHRATE
is a binary variable for REITs with an S&P rating of A or higher in the observation year. S&P
LOWRATE is a binary variable for REITs with an S&P rating of BB or lower in the sample year.
S&P NUMBER is an ordinal credit rating measure for the observation year ranging from 1 to 27,
corresponding to S&P Ratings C to AAA, respectively. LN(TOTAL CAP) is the natural logarithm
of the total capitalization of the REIT in the observation year. LN(M/B RATIO) is the natural
logarithm of the market-to-book ratio of the REIT in the observation year. D/A RATIO is the debt-
to-asset ratio of the REIT in the observation year. LN(ASSET MATURITY) is the natural logarithm of
the estimated maturity of the assets of the REIT for the observation year. Asset maturity is
calculated by dividing gross depreciable property by depreciation expense. FFO is the
percentage change from the actual current FFO per share to the expectation of FFOt1 as
measured by the I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO at time t. Robust Z-Statistics are reported in
parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.The Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  193
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INTERCEPT 3.082** 2.772* 1.730* 1.694**
(2.030) (1.790) (1.820) (1.910)
AVG S&P HIGHRATE 0.107 0.119
(0.330) (0.370)
AVG S&P LOWRATE 0.478*** 0.491***
(2.870) (2.750)
AVG S&P NUMBER 0.130*** 0.124***
(4.170) (3.710)
LN(AVG TOTAL CAP) 0.147* 0.128* 0.136** 0.128**
(1.800) (1.710) (1.990) (1.960)
LN(AVG M /B RATIO) 0.491** 0.501* 0.499* 0.405*
(2.050) (1.890) (1.850) (1.910)
AVG D /A RATIO 1.182** 0.894** 1.413** 1.296**
(2.100) (2.000) (2.620) (2.060)
LN(AVG ASSET MATURITY) 0.126 0.568 0.197 0.067
(0.540) (0.230) (0.880) (0.290)
AVG FFO 0.069 0.094 0.071 0.084
(0.380) (0.500) (0.960) (0.890)
DIVERSIFIED FOCUS 0.348* 0.371*
(1.850) (1.830)
HEALTH CARE FOCUS 0.742 0.390
(0.220) (0.120)
HOTEL FOCUS 0.043 0.099
(0.190) (0.400)
INDUSTRIAL FOCUS 0.333* 0.314*
(1.690) (1.730)
OFFICE FOCUS 0.038 0.062
(0.170) (0.300)
RESIDENTIAL FOCUS 0.267* 0.278*
(1.720) (1.890)
SELF STORAGE FOCUS 1.50*** 1.396***
(3.29) (3.260)
Adj. R2 0.134 0.453 0.194 0.499
Notes: The weighted-average maturity sample contains 312 observations on 85 REITs reporting
yearly weighted-average debt maturity between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2003. The
sample is restricted to REITs with a credit rating provided by at least one of three credit rating
companies. This exhibit reports the results of a cross-sectional regression model where the
dependent variable is the mean of the weighted-average maturity observations reported by each
REIT across the sample period, LN(TARGET MATURITY). Note that each REIT may be observed for194  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Exhibit 7  (continued)
Cross-Sectional Regression Models for REIT Mean Weighted-Average (Target) Maturity
only one or all sample years. AVG S&P HIGHRATE is a binary variable for REITs with an average
S&P rating of A or higher across the sample period. AVG S&P LOWRATE is a binary variable
for REITs with an average S&P rating of BB or lower across the sample period. AVG S&P
NUMBER is an ordinal credit rating measure ranging from 1 to 27, corresponding to sample
period average S&P Ratings C to AAA, respectively. In the case where an S&P rating was not
available but a Moody’s or Fitch rating was reported, the Moody’s or Fitch rating was converted
into the equivalent S&P rating. LN(AVG TOTAL CAP) is the natural logarithm of the average total
capitalization of each ﬁrm across the sample period. LN(AVG M/B RATIO) is the natural
logarithm of the average market-to-book ratio of each ﬁrm across the sample period. AVG D /A
RATIO is the average debt-to-asset ratio of the each REIT across the sample time period. LN(AVG
ASSET MATURITY) is the natural logarithm of the average estimated maturity of the assets of the
REIT across the sample period. Asset maturity is calculated by dividing gross depreciable property
by depreciation expense. AVG FFO is the average percentage change from the actual current
FFO per share to the expectation of FFOt1 as measured by the I/B/E/S analyst forecast of FFO
at time t. Binary variables are included for property focus of the REIT: DIVERSIFIED, HEALTH
CARE, HOTEL, INDUSTRIAL, OFFICE, RESIDENTIAL, SELF STORAGE, and RETAIL (reference). All
t-Statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Similarly, one could think of the REIT’s size as a proxy for information
asymmetry since larger ﬁrms tend to be covered by more analysts. As shown in
Exhibit 5, although larger ﬁrms appear to issue at shorter maturities, the result is
not statistically signiﬁcant. One explanation for the lack of signiﬁcance could be
that, under Flannery’s (1986) model, abnormally high reﬁnancing costs will lead
to a pooling equilibrium where high-quality and low-quality ﬁrms issue long-term
debt. However, as shown in Exhibits 6 and 7, the ﬁndings indicate that larger
ﬁrms actually have longer weighted-average maturities than their smaller
counterparts. Although this ﬁnding is statistically signiﬁcant, it is inconsistent with
the hypothesis and economically insigniﬁcant.
Personal Taxes
Next, Brick and Ravid’s (1985) theory that maturity varies with the slope of the
term structure is examined compared with Lewis’ (1990) tax-irrelevance
hypothesis. Due to the special tax-exempt status of REITs, a negative relationship
is expected between the effective slope of the term structure and debt maturity
since only the personal tax rate will inﬂuence the maturity decision.The Determinants of the Debt Maturity Decision  195
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As shown in Exhibit 5, and consistent with Brick and Ravid’s (1985) tax
hypothesis, the coefﬁcients on YIELD(30–1) are negative and signiﬁcant. In fact,
evaluating the data at the sample means, a ten basis point increase in the term-
structure spread is found to reduce the maturity of incremental debt by
approximately one year. Henderson, Jegadeesh, and Weisbach (2005) suggest that
ﬁrms time debt placements because interest rates are particularly high or low. To
conﬁrm that the results in Exhibit 5 are not driven by the level of interest rates
over the sample period, the level of the thirty-year U.S. Treasury bond is included
in the regression (not reported) to control for ﬁrms timing debt placements. No
qualitative change in the results is found; thus, the data favor the tax hypothesis
of Brick and Ravid (1985) over the irrelevance hypothesis proposed by Lewis
(1990).
Agency Problems
Myers (1977) suggests that ﬁrms with more growth opportunities should issue
short-term debt to control agency problems. Under this hypothesis, small ﬁrms,
and those with relatively high market-to-book ratios, are expected to issue at
shorter maturities. As shown in Exhibit 5, there is indeed a negative relation
between the maturity of new, incremental debt issues and the market-to-book ratio.
Although, contrary to the theory, it is found that larger ﬁrms issue shorter-term
incremental debt, the result is not statistically signiﬁcant. On the other hand, when
the weighted-average maturity of all debt is analyzed in Exhibit 6 and the mean
weighted-average (target) maturity of debt in Exhibit 7, both the market-to-book
ratio and ﬁrm size are statistically signiﬁcant, and the signs of both are consistent
with Myers’ (1977) hypothesis. In fact, when the data are evaluated at the sample
means, using the results from Model (3) in Exhibit 6, it is estimated that a 10%
increase in a ﬁrm’s market-to-book ratio would result in a 2% reduction in a ﬁrm’s
weighted-average maturity of debt. As noted previously, the results for ﬁrm size
are not economically signiﬁcant.
Myers (1977) suggests that matching debt maturity to the maturity of the ﬁrm’s
assets can reduce the agency costs of debt; however, no evidence is found that
REITs match debt maturity to asset maturity. Exhibits 6 and 7 reveal that, once
other characteristics of the ﬁrm are accounted for, longer asset maturity is actually
related to shorter debt maturity. Although the coefﬁcient is statistically
insigniﬁcant, it is consistent with Guedes and Opler’s (1996) ﬁnding and at odds
with Myers’ (1977) hypothesis. One possible explanation that could reconcile the
results with Myers (1977) is that REITs may match debt maturity to all assets,
including real options. The measure of asset maturity is only an approximation of
the maturity of assets in place. Since there is evidence that REITs with growth
options do shorten the maturity of their debt, it could be that the existence of real
options clouds the effect that maturity matching has on agency costs of debt.196  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
Property-Focus Control Variables
Although not directly addressed by the theories discussed above, when the cross-
sectional results on the incremental debt issues in Exhibit 5 are compared to the
cross-sectional results on the mean weighted-average (target) maturity of REIT
debt in Exhibit 7, the property-focus of a REIT does not affect its incremental
debt-maturity decision but does affect its average debt maturity level. In an
econometric sense, this result is not unexpected because the weighted-average
maturity of debt has relatively more power when examining time-invariant and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors related to maturity. Given that both asset maturity and
leverage decisions have been controlled for, this ﬁnding suggests that there are
other industry, or in this case property-speciﬁc, variables affecting target debt
maturity unaccounted for by current theory.
 Conclusion
Several papers have examined the determinants of debt maturity, but this issue
has yet to be fully examined in the context of REITs. The fact that REITs do not
pay corporate taxes and retain little to no earnings make them particularly
interesting vehicles through which to test the existing theories. Although Howe
and Shilling (1988) and Brown and Riddiough (2003) do present some evidence
with regard to REIT debt maturity, this research entertains a broader set of theories
and tests them jointly. Speciﬁcally, several theoretical hypotheses that REIT debt
maturity is inﬂuenced by liquidity risk, asymmetric information, personal taxes,
and agency problems are examined. In addition, the results are veriﬁed by using
both incremental debt issues and the weighted-average maturity of all outstanding
debt. Overall, the ﬁndings are robust to model speciﬁcation and suggest that
personal taxes and agency problems are the most effective theories in explaining
the maturity of REIT debt.
No support is found for the liquidity theory of debt maturity or the theory of a
non-monotonic maturity structure in credit ratings. Instead, using both incremental
debt issues and weighted-average maturity observations, the ﬁndings indicate a
positive relation between REIT debt maturity and ﬁrm quality as measured by
credit ratings. Furthermore, ﬁrms that privately place debt tend to do so at longer
maturities. This evidence is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991a) hypothesis. In
addition, there is little evidence that REITs signal information asymmetries by the
choice of their debt’s maturity. For instance, no evidence of a relation between
debt maturity and analyst predictions of future growth in FFO per-share is found.
Examining the role of taxes on debt maturity, the results are consistent with Brick
and Ravid’s (1985) theory suggesting a negative relation between the term
structure premium and debt maturity when the personal tax rate is greater than
the corporate tax rate. This result does not seem to reﬂect an attempt by REITs
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For agency problems, Myers (1977) suggests that high growth ﬁrms tend to issue
at shorter maturity and reduce agency costs by matching debt and asset maturity
as closely as possible. Using market-to-book ratios, ﬁrm size, and asset maturity,
there is evidence that REITs with more growth options shorten their debt maturity,
but there is no evidence that REITs match their debt maturity to their asset
maturity.
 Endnotes
1 Although the marginal personal and corporate tax rates are constant for qualiﬁed REITs
over the sample period, the tax theory posits a relation between the slope of the yield
curve and debt maturity conditional on the ordinal relation between corporate and
personal taxes. Therefore, it is the variation in the slope of the yield curve, not tax rates,
that permits a test of the tax hypothesis.
2 Stohs and Mauer (1996) and Brown and Riddiough’s (2003) use of an ordinal dummy
for credit ratings forces the econometric relation to be linear and monotonic in the rating.
Brown and Riddiough do, however, present descriptive statistics that suggest that average
maturity is monotonically increasing in bond ratings for low- to moderate-rated ﬁrms
while Stohs and Mauer present evidence that the relationship is in fact non-linear (but
not non-monotonic).
3 Although Brick and Ravid (1985) base their theory on the corporate term structure, the
yield curve plus a risk yield premium, the data in the current study only allows for
construction of the treasury yield curve without the risk premium. The analysis in this
study assumes that the risk premium is either ﬂat or increasing across maturities. In
such cases, the Brick and Ravid tax effect is understated. The measurement may be
inappropriate under unlikely cases such as an upward sloping treasury yield curve where
the risk premium is large for short-term debt but rapidly declines with maturity, thereby
causing a downward sloping corporate term structure.
4 Guedes and Opler (1996) note that this measure makes the reasonable assumption that
long-lived assets are depreciated slowly.
5 The SDC database is limited to bond offerings with maturities of at least one year.
6 The sample is thus restricted to REITs with ﬁnancial data available from the SNL
database.
7 This creates an unbalanced panel since a weighted-average maturity is not reported for
all REITs in every year of the sample period. In fact, SNL Financial does not report
weighted-average maturities for REITs until 1996, and reporting steadily improves over
time.
8 In the case where an S&P rating was not available but a Moody’s or Fitch rating was
reported, the Moody’s or Fitch rating was converted into the equivalent S&P rating. In
the case that a weighted-average maturity was observed in a particular year, but a credit
rating was not observed for that year, the most recently reported credit rating was used.
9 The CCC and CCC rated bonds in the sample were issued by Health Care REIT
(1997) and Essex Properties Trust (1998), respectively.
10 These models are also estimated using term to call and duration. The results using both
alternative measures are robust and consistent with those presented here.198  Highfield, Roskelley, and Zhao
11 The actual percentage change in FFO and Earnings per Share from the year of the issue
to the year following the issue were also used in addition to actual FFO relative to
analyst predictions in the year following the issue. The results were robust and consistent
with those reported here.
12 The weighed-average maturity sample consists of 312 observations across eight
unbalanced panels. There are 85 REITs reporting, but as shown in Exhibit 1, the largest
panel is the 7
th (2002) panel with 38 REITs reporting for the year. For robustness,
Equations 3 and 4 were also estimated using pooled OLS. These results (not reported)
are consistent with estimates obtained using the ﬁxed-effects models and are available
upon request.
13 As shown in Exhibit 2, the property focus variables are binary variables representing
diversiﬁed, healthcare, industrial, ofﬁce, residential, retail, and self storage REITs. Retail
is the largest and most consistently observed group in both the incremental and
weighted-average samples. Thus, the reference group is retail REITs in all regression
models using property-focus control variables.
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